



Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
David, M. and Meersohn Schmidt, C. (2018) 'Power and counter-power : knowledge structure and the limits of
control.', Sociological research online., 24 (2).
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1177/1360780418797717
Publisher's copyright statement:
David, M. Meersohn Schmidt, C. (2018). Power and Counter-Power: Knowledge Structure and the Limits of Control.
Sociological Research Online First Published September 24, 2018. Copyright c© 2018 The Author(s). Reprinted by
permission of SAGE Publications.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Power and Counter-Power: Knowledge Structure and the Limits of Control 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we explore Susan Strange’s multidimensional and non-reductive international 
political economy (IPE) approach to structural power. Strange’s key weakness is the failure 
to account for her knowledge structure’s regulative form relative to her security, production 
and financial structures. We seek to develop Strange’s account through the addition of 
Manuel Castells’ account of digital network structures. Castells’ morphogenic structural 
approach to digital network power helps clarify the mechanisms by which today’s knowledge 
structure achieves autonomy, internal regulation and generative capacity. This sociological 
completion of Strange’s theory, an international socio-political economy approach as it were, 
better explains the capacity and limits of today’s digital network knowledge structure to resist 
reduction to other structural interests. Strange’s non-reductive structural approach to power is 
significant for sociology as it helps identify ‘social order’ in a global age, but an additional 
sociological dimension is also necessary for the fulfilment of Strange’s theoretical project. 
 




This paper highlights the value of Susan Strange’s multi-dimensional structural account, even 
whilst sociologically supplementing Strange’s International Political Economy’s weakest link 
(that of knowledge structure). We begin by outlining how Strange avoids the reductive 
determinism of any one structure through a multidimensional account of production, finance, 
security and knowledge structures. The question of what regulates the play of priorities 
between competing structures highlights an unresolved weakness in Strange’s work, that of 
what ‘knowledge structure’ actually means. We suggest Manuel Castells’ morphogenic 
structural account of digital networks better conceptualises knowledge structure. Finally, we 
explore how far attempts to colonise today’s knowledge structure by production, finance and 
security interests (see Table One) undermines the autonomy, order and efficacy of digital 
network communications. Whilst colonisation attempts are real and significant, they are not 
fundamentally successful, and, as such, knowledge structure, as we conceptualise it, is real. 
Susan Strange is significant for sociology; firstly, because she aspires to an account of social 
order in a global age; the social has not been dissolved by unregulated economic competition 
even after nation states ceased to appear synonymous with the category of ‘societies’; and 
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Table One: Structures and their Primary Agents, Goals, Objects and Values 
 
Strange’s international political economy theory was central to the late- and post-cold war 
turn against state centric (‘realist’) theory. One strand of anti-realism highlights transnational 
neo-liberal deregulation and global corporate regulation beyond state control. Today’s 
attention to the interplay of state authority and market exchange (Crouch 2004 and May 
2015) reflects Strange’s influence. Production, finance and political structures are core but 
knowledge is not ignored. However, in Colin Crouch’s Knowledge Corruptors (2016) and 
Christopher May’s (2007a) digital rights management research, production interests dominate 
knowledge. May’s intellectual property research identifies open source challenges to 
dominant institutions, but here too economic and political actors largely control knowledge 
(2007b). Another strand of anti-realism questions the rationality of state actors: post-realism 
adopting an intertextual approach (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989 and Smith et al. 1996); 
whilst critical theorists (Held 2010) identify cosmopolitan agencies motivated by universal 
value rationality beyond instrumental state interests. For some anti-realists, knowledge is 
driven by economic and political structures. For other anti-realists knowledge is autonomous 
text. Strange’s structural approach sought to avoid this split within anti-reductionist IR 
scholarship.  
May (2002) questions Castells’ claims regarding the disruptive effect of the internet on 
capitalism. Assigning the mode of development (the forces of production) an autonomous 
capacity to affect outcomes is, for May, technological determinism, though Castells’ (2009) 
later account of communication power is closer to May in integrating knowledge networks 
with dominant economic and political networks (David et al., 2017). Here we distinguish 
scope for counter power afforded by networks from the notion that such resistance is 
inevitable. New possibilities are not compulsions. An account of knowledge structure, 
irreducible to either technical systems or other social structures, nor simply a free-floating 
intertextual signifier; is what remained incomplete in Strange’s own account, and remains 
divergent in later strands of anti-realism. Here we offer resources for an account of 
knowledge structure that we hope can assist in overcoming these limitations. 
 
Susan Strange’s Multidimensional Theory of Power 
Strange’s fundamental aim is to move beyond the relational theory of power manifest in 
‘realist’ approaches to international relations (IR), towards a structural theory of power.  
Relational power… is the power of A to get B to do something that they would not 
otherwise do…. Structural power, on the other hand, is the power to shape and 
determine the structures of the global political economy… (Strange, 1994a, p. 25). 
There are winners and losers in particular interactions and within ongoing relationships, but 
such outcomes are shaped not just by the relative capacities of actors (states, non-
governmental organisations or individuals), but also by the rules and conditions within which 
such actors ‘play’. If realists take such rules and resources for granted and simply study 
relations between actors, critical theorists tend to focus on the uneven nature of the ‘playing 
field’.  Strange  highlights structures to demonstrate their necessity for the effective, if often 
highly unequal, pursuit of desirable goals. She criticises states, firms and other organisations 
for failing to maintain effective structures; she problematizes blind pursuit of relational 
advantage by powerful actors that leads to a neglect of structural order; and she highlights 
that different structures may in fact come into conflict with one another. To this end, even 
whilst she rejects a purely Hobbesian realist concern with security as an overriding priority in 
International Relations (IR), she also rejects the Marxist Political Economy (PE) counterpoint 
that the economy determines everything else. Her International Political Economy (IPE) 
approach notes that the tension between state focus on security and market focus on wealth 
creation cannot be simply reconciled, nor can it be reduced from one to the other. As she 
notes, “economics tacitly prefers efficiency and international relations tacitly prefers peace.” 
(Strange, 1994a, p. 175). 
Strange wants to make things more complicated than simply noting the tension between a 
Hobbesian attention to security and a Marxist attention to material production. Her model of 
power has four dimensions, not just two. These are security, production, finance and 
knowledge: “[T]he security structure and the production, financial and knowledge structures 
constantly interact with each other and cannot therefore be analysed in isolation.” (Strange, 
1999, p. 346).  Each of these four power structures, Strange claims, acts to frame and shape 
the conduct of relational power within them. However, she also claims no one of these 
structures is either fully independent or even fully distinct from any of the others; and that no 
one of these structures is predominant in determining the others. To the extent that Strange 
rejects the notion that any one structure regulates the overall social order, and that there are 
multiple structures in play, the question of how exactly any one supposed structure regulates 
relational power becomes a case of empirical enquiry. Whilst rejecting the goal of prediction 
in social science, Strange does claim that theory should explain events – even if such 
explanations are always retrospective and particular, not universal predictions. Her studies – 
of state rivalries and globalised production (Stopford, Strange and Henley, 1991), and of 
finance, credit and market deregulation (Strange, 1997, 1998) – have all been such attempts 
to explain the particular in terms of a complex, multidimensional structural theory. Yet, 
whilst states, property and money are relatively clear objects of study when addressing 
security, production and financial structures respectively, the knowledge structure remained 
more opaque. 
The fallacy is that while some things are not entirely new, it is not true that nothing is 
new (Strange, 1994b, p. 210). 
Strange suggests that the future is not what it used to be:  
Changes in the four primary structures of finance, production, security and knowledge 
(ideas and their communication systems) are slowly but surely eroding the power of 
states to provide for their own security from attack; to intervene to correct slumps and 
unemployment; to determine the value of currencies at home and abroad; to raise 
revenues by taxing enterprises; to demand military service from conscripts; to satisfy 
the welfare needs of citizens (Strange, 1994b, p. 213). 
It is not that power is diminishing, nor that traditional ‘authorities’ (primarily nation states – 
and predominant amongst these, the United States of America) are disappearing or becoming 
redundant. Rather, the ‘Westfailure’ system (Strange, 1999) of states is being replaced by a 
tripartite system of state-to-state, state-to-firm and firm-to-firm negotiations of power 
(Stopford, Strange and Henley, 1991). It is the transnational firm that has risen to power in 
recent decades to match the power of states at the negotiating table, and Strange even refers 
to the emergence of a global business civilisation (Strange, 1990).  
 
Mismatched Structures, Values and Conflicts 
For Strange there is no single goal or value to which all others are subservient. Such goals or 
values as wealth, justice, security and freedom are not reducible one to another and different 
individuals, regimes and social institutions will place greater or lesser value on each relative 
to the others when determining what they consider a ‘rational’ course of action; they may 
even interpret each of these goals/values differently. The balance between values, as well as 
the meaning attached to each such value is undetermined by any universal metric or 
philosophy.  
However, a double tension exists for Strange in the relationship between supposed structures 
and the values that motivate action. Whilst, for her, the four dominant power structures are, 
as stated, security, production, finance and knowledge, the four dominant values described 
above only partially align with them. For example, whilst security is seen to be both a 
structure and a value, the value of wealth is linked to both production and finance structures. 
If freedom, meanwhile, is simply the absence of political control, Strange does suggest that 
money creates that space for liberty (Strange, 1994a, p. 25). However, if freedom is the 
absence of want, then production may best achieve that, combined with a demand for justice 
and security (Strange, 1999).  In places, Strange links values to structures. Elsewhere, values 
are seen to emerge from within the knowledge structure, and only then filter out to determine 
priorities between other structural goals concerning security, production and finance. 
Strange accepts some element of realist state theory when accounting for her security 
structure, but counterbalances this with recourse to a largely Marxist account of the 
production structure. She then adds her own detailed account of the finance structure to limit 
the reductive force of Marx’s account of capital accumulation. Strange’s detailed mapping of 
relations between these three structures further highlights the most significant weakness in 
her account: the meaning and content of a supposed knowledge structure, and the relationship 
such a structure has with other structures. Security, production and finance are shown to have 
clear relational objects – defence, property and money respectively – each within its own 
system of regulation (structural power). It might be suggested that safety, wealth and 
confidence represent the core values linked to the security, production and finance structures 
(see Table One). Strange details how, whilst interacting, security, production and finance 
structures maintain a degree of autonomy, internal ordering and generative effect relative to 
one another. This is what makes each a non-reducible structure in her view. What remains 
lacking is a developed account of knowledge structuring power, the mechanisms that sustain 
some degree of external autonomy, internal self-regulation as well as generative effect, and 
that would therefore evidence the knowledge structure.  
Strange points out that priests and sages have often asserted authority over warriors, farmers 
and traders in pre-modern societies, and can sometimes still do so today (Strange, 1994a, p. 
30). This, she argues, shows their knowledge structures (in religious doctrines of salvation, 
damnation and heresy) were not reducible to physical security, property or money. She also 
suggests that, today, science retains – sometimes – a similar degree of autonomy from 
reduction to military and economic expediency (Strange, 1994a, p. 122). Suggesting a degree 
of autonomy for knowledge producers, however, still does not offer a substantive account of 
the internal regulative structuring of such a field, in either producing internal order, resisting 
external determination, or in generative action.  
 
The ‘weakness’ in the theory, not the ‘limitations’ of theory 
Chris May suggests “some possible shortcomings of Strange’s work, namely the difficulties 
in conceptualising a ‘knowledge structure’ and in understanding the mechanics of historical 
‘change’ in the international political economy.” (May, 1996, p. 167).  The former issue, of 
conceptualising the knowledge structure, is a significant problem within Strange’s theory. 
However, the inability to predict the future is a limitation of all social theories. Strange’s non-
predictive approach to complex interactions between multiple structures and between actors 
within them is in fact highly productive precisely because it is not prescriptive or predictive.  
Whilst relational power, in Strange’s framework, can allow a dominant state, transnational 
firm or other actor to exercise leverage in influencing the rules by which relational exchange 
takes place, dominant relational actors often bear the cost of maintaining such power 
structures – and less powerful actors may be able to exercise forms of resistance or 
adjustment that the dominant players cannot. Dominant structures facilitate and even 
encourage challenges. The non-predictive nature of Strange’s complex, multi-dimensional 
account of power allows us to better study the contradictory nature of power in today’s global 
network society. Whilst May is correct to say non-prediction is a limitation, we do not 
consider this limitation one that can be solved. As such, we focus on the weakness in 
Strange’s conception of knowledge structure, and what can be done to solve that. Whilst 
Strange’s international political economy approach goes beyond reductive state and 
production based theories, it remains deficient, and requires a sociological dimension, 
enabling what we would call an international socio-political economy approach. Accepting 
the value of Strange’s work, we want to take it one-step further. In today’s ‘network society’, 
we ask whether the concept of ‘knowledge structure’ is valid. Given the security, production 
and financial forces that shaped today’s global network architecture, do digital networks 
manifest the characteristics that would warrant the notion of ‘knowledge structure’: i.e. 
substantial levels of autonomy from external determination, internal self-regulation and 
generative effect back on the external environment? 
 
Knowledge Structure: Information, Communication and Beliefs? 
As May (1996, p. 184) writes:  
While the inclusion of the fourth structure – knowledge – is what makes the general 
theory [of Strange’s] so alluring, it also opens up a major problem area insomuch as it 
forces the theory to deal with issues that in its current state of theoretical development 
it has difficulty understanding.  
Strange indeed admits as much. The knowledge structure is a less well understood but no less 
significant form of structural power, she argues.  
This is partly because it comprehends what is believed (and the moral conclusions and 
principles derived from those beliefs); what is known and perceived as understood; 
and the channels by which beliefs, ideas and knowledge are communicated – 
including some people and excluding others (Strange, 1994a, p. 119). 
Knowledge then, according to Strange, covers beliefs, information and communication – 
three very broad and complex concepts, whose interconnections are even more difficult to pin 
down.  
Strange seeks to make things a little simpler for herself by effacing the distinction between 
knowledge and information (Strange, 1994a, p. 122), and distancing herself from discussions 
regarding the sociology and philosophy of knowledge (Strange, 1994a, p. 136). However, she 
does still wish to retain the notion that knowledge is structured in a similar fashion to other 
kinds of social relationship:  
If a production structure determines what is produced, by what means, by whose 
efforts and on what terms, so a knowledge structure determines what knowledge is 
discovered, how it is stored, and who communicates it by what means to whom and 
on what terms (Strange, 1994a, p. 121). 
Despite accepting her knowledge structure formulation ‘was too sketchily explained’ Strange 
rightly refused to specify in advance how knowledge ‘interacts with and affects the other 
structures’ (1996a: 304). She uses an example. Belief in economic growth reinforces the 
capitalist production structure, whilst Buddhist economics would challenge it (if 
disseminated). However, despite Strange’s resistance, this does beg May’s (1996) question of 
how knowledge structure (belief and communication combined) can, if it ever does, challenge 
rather than reinforce other structures. Does knowledge have the structural properties Strange 
identifies in production, finance and security? May’s question is important because, as 
Strange rightly suggests, the answer is not pre-given. 
This article cannot resolve, nor even fully catalogue all sociological attempts to explain or 
understand culture and knowledge. Marx’s ideology critique through to Gramsci, the 
Frankfurt School, Williams, Hall and subsequent accounts of hegemony, Durkheim’s 
conscience collective through structuralism and beyond, Simmel’s formalist approach, 
Weber’s interpretivism and elective affinity, subsequent variations of phenomenology, 
Mannheim’s relational approach, Blumer, Becker and others’ variations of symbolic 
interactionism, Geertz’s thick description, Bourdieu’s relational approach to habitus, 
figuration/structuration and beyond all set out to document the interplay of regulative systems 
of knowing in relation to individual belief, and the interplay of such regulative systems of 
knowing with economic and political systems. Dispute hinges over the degrees of 
determination within and between regulative systems, their conceptual boundaries and their 
scale.  
We suggest, following Paul McLean (2017) that network analysis offers a route through this 
conceptual labyrinth. Network analysis focuses attention on exploring complex interactions 
rather than starting from any one pre-given theory. Communication networks precede today’s 
digital network architecture. Communication networks are channels through which 
information connects actors. Information is abstracted meaningful content, such as it can be 
stored, processed and distributed through communication networks. This is true of spoken 
languages and writing as much as of print, post, telegraph, broadcasting and today’s digital 
networks. Knowledge refers to meaningful content enacted in cultural practice. The 
distinction between information and knowledge/culture parallels that between text and 
context. Communication networks and culture/knowledge may be shaped by economic and 
political interests, but may afford levels of autonomy and influence of their own. Newspapers 
challenged the status quo in 17th century Europe but were largely colonised by advertising 
revenues in the 19th century. The printing press fuelled agitation in one context, but 
reinforced centralised authority in others. Whether cultural networks are colonised by other 
interests or sustain a degree of autonomy, self-regulation and external effect requires 
empirical study. If the latter is the case, we would suggest such a combination of 
communication networking and cultural practice constitutes a knowledge structure in the 
sense that Strange describes other structures.  
McLean offers a five dimensional account of the relationship between networks and culture. 
‘Networks from culture’ refers to existing cultural forms shaping the development of 
communication networks; ‘cultures from networks’ and ‘networks as culture’ are poles in a 
spectrum along which communication networks shape or determine new cultural content; 
‘culture through networks’ refers to the way particular network forms can accelerate and 
reinvent existing cultural practices; whilst ‘networks of culture’ refers to relational 
emergence or co-construction. Today’s digital network architecture shapes and is shaped by 
cultural content. The extent to which what arises is or is not reducible to other structural 
forces is what interests us. As McLean documents networks do not determine cultural 
content. Knowledge structure, if it exists, cannot dictate every last norm, value and belief 
held by individuals. However, networks may sustain, afford or even encourage new ‘horizons 
of possibility’ or ‘social imaginaries’ (Taylor, 2004) in the face of ideological colonisation by 
dominant economic and political interests, warranting classification as a knowledge structure 
In what follows, Castells’ theory of digital networks as morphogenic structures will be 
deployed to provide Strange’s theory of knowledge structure with a clearer focus.  
 
Digital Networks as Knowledge Structure and the Limits of Power 
Manuel Castells (1989) showed how increased computer storage and processing power – and 
particularly networked computing scope and power – was initially fuelled by largely US 
corporate, state and military interests. Such investment, however, created a network of 
affordances that enabled what Castells called ‘capitalist perestroika’: a shift from hierarchical 
command and control, towards more distributed network enterprises. The newly created 
‘space of flows’, ‘timeless time’ and ‘real virtuality’(Castells, 2000) enabled the rise of 
today’s global network capitalism – akin to what Strange variously documents in her 
accounts of today’s global finance, production and trade. In creating conditions within which 
particular forms of action are made either easier or possible at all, digital networks represent, 
Castells claims, structures that are irreducible to relational interactions. Such structures 
condition the scope for activity of human agents. Castells refers to this performative quality 
of digital networks as morphogenic structure. For Castells, digital networks are irreducible to 
the interests of the production, finance and political actors that initially enabled them, and are 
also irreducible to the actors whose actions currently constitute them. We suggest Castells’ 
account of digital networks as today’s knowledge structure enables a sociological completion 
of Strange’s otherwise incomplete approach. We do not simple seek to criticize Strange from 
Castells’ sociological viewpoint, but rather to improve the former’s insightful perspectives 
my means of the insights offered by the latter.   
Before 2000 Castells’ documented political (Castells, 1997) and cultural (Castells, 1998) 
reactions to the new economic ‘mode of production’ afforded by digital network structures, 
identifying networks as the latest technical ‘mode of development’. However, in recent work, 
Castells has sought to map out a more complex relationship between economic, political and 
cultural power (Castells, 2009) and (at least, cultural and political) counter-power (Castells, 
2012). Crucial to the maintenance of power within networks is the ability to programme and 
switch. Programming refers to the content of networks, whilst switching refers to the ability 
to connect networks – and hence connect to the programming (content) within those 
networks.  
Network programming and switching permeate economic, political and cultural systems. 
Digital networks constitute the knowledge structure in modern societies, and this structure 
has significant impacts on other structures as well. Castells identifies Rupert Murdoch as the 
paradigmatic network node (or super-node), someone at the centre of a wide range of 
networks and, within his array of cross-media, global corporate holdings, in a position of 
power to control the content (programming) and flow (switching) of information. Global 
digital networks – the largely privately owned cables, satellites, packet-switching routers, 
decoders, subscription services, internet service providers, search engines, software and 
hardware providers, and content providers, etc. – are, in Castells’ account of communication 
power, a powerful morphogenic structure influencing thought, culture, politics and economic 
life (Castells, 2009). Castells offers a significant supplement to Strange’s relatively 
underdeveloped account of structural power in today’s information technology networks.  
A structural account of power explains agency, the capacity to cause effects, as a product of 
position within a systematic allocation of resources, not simply at the surface level of 
individual interactions. All structures are networks, systems of communication, and actors 
(individuals or not) are nodes in such networks. Bureaucratic modern states are ideal typical 
hierarchies with network communication colonised to transmit information in vertical chains, 
rather than horizontally. Capitalist markets and production systems are more distributed, but 
remain hierarchical through money, management and property rights.  
The significance of networks for an understanding of power within and between social 
structures lies in the extent to which networks afford power and counter power (resistance). 
Georg Simmel (McLean, 2017: chapter 2) identified the third in any triad as fundamental to 
understanding the structure of power regulating micro-interactions. If A knows B and B 
knows C, but A does not know C, both A and C require B to mediate. B occupies a ‘structural 
hole’. They may act as a bridge overcoming the gap, an exploiter of its maintenance, or even 
a conqueror through widening divisions. Transitive triads generate hierarchical chains. 
Circular triads – scissors, stone and paper for example – foster greater equality. A fully 
distributed network, where all nodes are effectively connected to all other nodes, affords a 
level of egalitarian communication that challenges hierarchy. Where the printing press 
widened access to text, editorial controls and censors acted to regulate culture at the nodal 
nexus (the structural hole) between production and consumption. Old print and broadcast 
media’s editorial nexus allowed political/economic structural interests to exercise control. 
Today’s digital network architecture is designed to avoid such structural holes, singular 
pinch-points in the transmission of information. However, as Castells observes someone like 
Rupert Murdoch stands out as a super-node even within today’s network society. Google and 
Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft and Apple are the biggest such super-nodes on the internet, 
actively seeking to exploit their popularity to create effective structural holes. Whether these 
holes in the knowledge structure are successfully used to effect political and economic 
control over culture (such as in the efforts to manipulate voting or consumption patterns 
through micro-targeting) is the on-going struggle of our time. Such structural holes, if 
successfully used as editorial nexus points, undo the relative autonomy of the knowledge 
structure. However, the internet is not simply the sum of its more powerful super-nodes, in 
their efforts to re-programme the internet with old media forms of central control. 
On the Internet and Web, power is affected by means of the very protocols that enable 
distributed communications (Gallaway, 2004). Distributed, packet-switching, network 
architecture prohibits centralised and even decentralised modes of censorship and regulation, 
as messages can be rerouted to avoid blockages. However, the Internet Engineering Task 
Force is the (mainly US-based) group who determine the protocols that assign addresses 
online, and which writes the common code that enables distributed computers to 
communicate without a central server. Such a role is a quintessential form of networked 
structural power (programming and switching). Nonetheless, Castells’ structural analysis of 
digital network power highlights affordances for counter-power as well as for dominance. 
The relational dominance of the United States in computing (Castells, 1996) – a dominance 
that allows one country to largely determine the protocols that networked computers use, and 
the address/searching systems that search engines use to locate content – does not mean that 
this state can control content online. To censor the Internet in this fashion (by removing the 
IP addresses of countries the United States does not approve of, for example) would destroy 
the very global communication structure within which the United States enjoys its relational 
advantage (David, 2017). As such, and in line with Strange’s account of power, dominance is 
not without limits. Even Rupert Murdoch’s capacity to close down those that would challenge 
his power to programme and switch within digital networks is limited. Digital networks 
afford some degree of autonomy, internal regulation and generative effect, and we suggest 
this is sufficient to warrant the term knowledge structure. 
In this article we evaluate the claims for the 1. Autonomy/non-reducability; 2. Internal 
regulative efficacy; and 3. Generative effect (impacting upon other structural systems) of 
digital networks. Table One sets out the elements that are the focus of our discussion. Do 
digital networks structure the flow of communication in the way that the state, capital and 
markets structure security, production and finance through defence, property and money? If 
so, the object of action within the knowledge structure, information, would display the 
‘structural qualities’ outlined above, of external autonomy, internal self-regulation and 
generative effect. This prediction can be tested by identifying whether information flows 
resist regulation by production, finance, and security structures; as, 1. Intellectual property 
under the dominance of capital/property in the interests of wealth creation; as, 2. Marketing 
asset for sales and to maintain market confidence; or as 3. Surveillance and state secrets 
ordered around the priorities of the defence and the value of safety. Capital, markets and 
states certainly seek to control the flow of information. However, digital networks afford 
alternative forms of communication, constructions of information and values. In the 
following three sections, we show firstly how attempts by actors from within the production 
structure seek to control information flows within digital networks as tradable assets in the 
form of intellectual property. Secondly, we look at similar attempts to reduce 
information/communication to financial interests in the form of advertiser colonisation of 
traditional and new media. Finally, we show similar attempts and resistances to control 
information in the interests of state security. By affording distributed information flows, 
digital networks resist reduction of knowledge to other structural interests, encourage a 
‘social imaginary’ conducive to the free circulation of information, and challenges other 
structural interests and the values associated with them. 
 
Information: Culture or Capital? 
Production based interests seek to regulate information to secure wealth by defending 
property (see Table One – column three). However, digital networks afford the creation and 
distribution of information beyond the control of these external constraints, and so manifest 
what might reasonably be called a knowledge structure. Paralleling Strange (1996b, pp. 106–
7), Castells (2009, p. 86) writes: “The 1996 US Telecommunications Act, the founding of the 
World Trade Organization in 1995, and support for media privatisation from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international institutions helped to denationalize the 
processes of media production and distribution.”. Whilst deregulation of the media took place 
by such means, it also saw a wholesale intensification of regulation. The first action of the 
World Trade Organization was the replacement of GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade) with TRIPS (the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
agreement). Whilst WTO seeks to deregulate trade, TRIPS requires all signatories to WTO to 
sign into their own domestic-legislation newly extended and globally harmonised monopoly 
rights for IP holders from all other signatory states, not just their own (David, 2017). Media 
corporations still require states to enforce regulation in their rights to collect monopoly rents 
on informational goods. However immaterial goods circulate freely (as non-rivalrous public 
goods) when not effectively protected by intellectual property law in all states combined. 
Despite de jure protection, the circulation of immaterial goods without payment does happen. 
The United States used its extensive relational power to press through the TRIPS agreement, 
which then gave it additional structural advantage. The limit on TRIPS comes from the fact 
that the affordances of a US-led global digital network structure actually mean infringement 
of intellectual property is now possible on a scale previously unimaginable.  
The capacity to share IP-infringing content online became clear in 1999, when a seventeen- 
year digital profit storm in the music industry, ushered in by the compact disc, collapsed with 
the arrival of the Napster file-sharing service. Sharing software simply became more 
distributed in its structure with each legal attempt to target particular nodes within the 
network (uploaders, downloaders, software providers and internet service providers). 
Technical attempts to lock down content with various forms of encryption have proven 
equally unsuccessful, as free-sharing software coders have hacked every corporate form of 
digital rights management that has been introduced (David, 2017). Moreover, what started in 
music has migrated out to other forms of digital content, to film, books, journalism, computer 
games and television – and then to live television content. The advent of the 3D printer is 
even making IP-rich physical goods open to free sharing. Sky/Fox seek to sell live sports 
broadcasting. Others stream it for nothing, using Internet services supplied by Sky/Fox 
amongst other equally conficted businesses. The production structure does not fully control 
the knowledge structure. If Rupert Murdoch is the paradigmatic master of the knowledge 
structure, the failure of his Sky/Fox television broadcasting companies to prevent mass 
livestreaming of his monopoly-rights-regulated sports programming, often using Internet 
services provided by his companies, is evidence that, even at the heart of power, there is 
substantial counter-power – that is, from within the knowledge structure (David, 2017).  
The wide spread peer to peer sharing of information initially produced/distributed for wealth 
creation by IP holders, indicates that the architecture of the digital network knowledge 
structure affords a flow of information beyond the production structure’s control. Free 
programming and switching of information in digital networks has been a common practice 
since personal computers entered households in the early and middle years of the 1980's.  
Independent and free-share information products – such as the Linux operating system and 
LaTeX word processor –first started to be co-produced and distributed by users in the early 
1990s, in distinction from top-down programming and marketing of products like Windows 
and its Office package.  
The co-production of free-share software constitutes not only a resistance to attempts from 
within the production structure to colonize the knowledge structure. Free-share software also 
displays the capacity of network communications to generate information that permeates 
other structures. First, free-share software allows peer collaboration. Second, because it is 
open source, it is more flexible and capable of adapting than corporate products. In contrast, 
corporate strategies are usually based on the incompatibility of their products with those of 
commercial and non-commercial competitors. As a result, a third driver emerges, elegance 
(the simplest fusion of access and adaptation). This is why, for instance, LaTeX is preferred 
in academic and financial settings over commercial text processors. The protocols that govern 
Internet communications cannot be owned, and the World Wide Web Consortium prohibits 
intellectual property (IP) claims over the web’s core code.  
The valuing of knowledge as free information that is co-produced and shared across the 
network frames a belief over what information is and who has the right to use, adapt and 
distribute it. The value of information as culture, not capital, something to be freely shared, 
has institutionalized the belief that at least some forms of knowledge should be available to 
everyone. The digital infrastructure has allowed the proliferation of free or low cost 
educational software. Since its release in 2012, the award-winning free language learning 
platform Duolingo, has expanded from two to over twenty languages. Although they keep a 
management team responsible for the friendly interface and learning structure, the 
development of Duolingo’s courses is done by volunteer bilingual contributors that monitor 
the accuracy of each other’s work.  Moreover, its legitimacy as an educational tool has been 
institutionalized by its success in formal educational environments, through Duolingo’s 
classroom version, and the launch of their language certificate in partnership with Carnegie 
Mellon University.  
 
Information: Meaning or Marketing? 
What then of the influence of finance (money and marketing – see Table One – column four) 
in seeking to determine the knowledge structure? Every week, multiple digital applications 
are released. Many are made free to users through advertising. Belief in the right to produce, 
know and share information, challenges dominant interests within the production structure. 
Two decades of legal, technical and cultural efforts by record companies to limit free digital 
sharing have failed. The nearest thing to success is free legal sharing services sponsored by 
advertising. Even copyright infringing downloading and streaming services are 
predominantly financed by advertising. Does free-sharing’s  challenge to the authority of the 
production structure necessarily surrender digital networks to the finance structure in the 
form of advertising revenues? We suggest not.  
Taylor argues that one of the defining characteristics of the modern public sphere is that it 
constitutes a space of discussion about economic and state power, but that it is consciously 
seen as existing outside of such power structures (Taylor, 2004). It is also a meta-topical 
space, ideally disengaged from specific locations, parties or organisations. The public sphere 
is, then, an unofficial discussion about state/economic power, outside of such powers, but 
with a challenger role in relation to them. The modern public sphere emerged simultaneously 
with the nation-state as an imagined community. Anderson explains that newspapers were 
fundamental to the emergence of these imagined communities; they were able to 
communicate, on a single page, events that happened in different times and places  
(Anderson, 1991). The emergence of the public sphere in 18th century Europe saw a 
relatively autonomous knowledge structure develop, insofar as it was not controlled by the 
needs of the newly emerging state power. “A social imaginary carries within it an image of 
moral order, which imbues embodied practices and the accompanying cultural forms with 
meaning and legitimacy.” (Taylor, 2004, p. 189) Having escaped reduction to state power, 
newspapers (and, later, broadcast mass media) were subsequently, and continue to be, 
colonised by commercial interests (Habermas, 1992 [1962]). New media networks today 
recreate the public sphere, and hence the possibility of a relatively autonomous knowledge 
structure (Dutton, 2009), because alternative channels and messages proliferate beyond the 
capacity of state and commercial control over content.   
What has changed is that, where broadcast and print media channels control their mediated 
public communication, this editorial nexus is weaker in new media. New media is awash with 
advertising content, but, unlike traditional broadcast and print media, there is no editorial 
nexus by which content is determined by state/commercial interests in a manner comparable 
to what has been the case in newspapers since the 19th century and with radio and television 
since the 20th century. What citizens come to believe as natural, necessary and right about 
information and communication, constitute the social imaginaries of the knowledge structure. 
Social imaginaries, although they are institutionalized beliefs, are not static structures. On the 
contrary, social imaginaries are permanently contested in the public sphere. Self-selecting 
new media ‘bubbles’, combined with attempts by commercial/political actors to colonise 
search engine algorithms to spread ‘fake news’, recreate elements of closure previously 
afforded by editorial controls. Such pathologies reinvent old problems that new media can at 
least offer some potential to overcome, even if such potential is not always realised.  
Attempts to remove ‘net neutrality’ to advantage commercial interests, chips away as the 
elegance of non-reduction in today’s distributed knowledge structure (Berners-Lee, 2014). 
The decision of the Federal Communication Commission of the United States in December 
2017 to redefine internet access as a commercial service rather than as a public utility 
increases the scope for throttling and slowing, prioritising and limiting access on commercial 
grounds. However, such practices are prohibited in most other Western countries, have 
produced significant resistance where they have been adopted, and has highlighted for many 
in the US the need to select service providers more carefully to avoid having one’s access 
‘managed’ in a non-neutral fashion. 
The belief that information must or even wants to be free is a social imaginary fostered, 
circulated and empowered by a digital network knowledge structure that cannot be shut down 
by powerful economic interests. The rise of ‘super-nodes’ (Baker 2018) within the internet’s 
distributed network architecture, in particular Google and Facebook, create a hierarchical 
ecology of attention that tilts towards ‘old media’ centralisation. The central servers through 
which such businesses direct users, and the scope this creates to mine user content and link it 
to targeted promotional content again replicates ‘old media’ models of centralised access and 
dissemination. Nonetheless, these central server based super-nodes do not eliminate the 
distributed architecture they parasitize. Whilst commercially or politically motivated ‘fake 
news’ replicates online the worst features of old media propaganda, new media at least 
retains the potential to look elsewhere, assuming of course that old media style censorship is 
resisted. Making network providers liable for user-generated content would require service 
providers to act as editors/censors, and has been variously contested politically and 
undermined technically.   
 
The Informed or the Informer Society? 
Resistance to control over the knowledge structure discussed above in relation to production 
and finance exists as well in the interaction between the knowledge and security structures. 
Such interaction is particularly sensitive given that modern societies have bestowed upon the 
state the responsibility for public security. However, changes in distribution and access to 
information facilitated by digital networks created a society that is as vigilant of the state, as 
the state is vigilant over its citizens.   
Chadwick and Collister (2014) illustrate how The Guardian’s reporting on documents leaked 
online by whistle-blower Edward Snowden, leaks which evidenced U.S security 
infrastructure surveillance of British and U.S citizens, led to a wave of news and comment 
questioning government actions in the name of ‘security’. The official National Security 
position that such matters were ‘Top Secret’ and so not open to discussion, and the charges of 
treason levelled against Snowden, did not control the media storm. The Obama 
administration was held liable for the actions of security agencies deemed wrong by the 
‘court of public opinion’ beyond state control. Obama was forced to admit that the National 
Security Agency had “engaged in ‘bulk collection’ and mass storage of large quantities of 
metadata from the phone communications of millions of Americans and that such mass 
storage should come to an end” (Chadwick and Collister, 2014, p. 2421). 
Digital networks allow a technologically equipped citizenry to participate in public debate, 
reconnecting audiences with their imagined communities, and allowing the emergence of new 
communities defined not by territorial boundaries but by political sensibilities. The enabling 
of such communities of public opinion afforded by alternative media, themselves enlivening 
traditional media as well, sustain overt challenges to state censorship. WikiLeaks is the 
paradigmatic example of alternative media contesting the exclusivity of state control over 
security information, and opening an avenue for discussion in the public sphere about the 
boundaries of public information. In particular, state practices warranted on grounds of public 
security have been questioned in two ways: firstly, over the legitimacy of on mass 
surveillance of private citizens; and secondly, concerning the veil of secrecy behind which 
such a surveillance strategy has been concealed. This debate proliferated not just through 
WikiLeaks and alternative media more widely, but also through mainstream media. However, 
it is the distributed architecture of the Internet that affords such knowledge getting and 
staying outside the control of the security structure. Once again, digital networks foster belief 
in citizens’ rights to know, afford challenges to control, and resists reduction of knowledge to 
other interests.  
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and administration have each been characterised by 
harsh and spontaneous remarks on twitter. However, this departure from traditional media 
management has been a two-way street. Trump’s attempts at discrediting mainstream media 
channels as producers of ‘fake news’ has fuelled criticism not only of his administration. His 
character and personal suitability for office are also under constant discussion in the digital 
public sphere. Trump has surrounded himself with high profile media gurus who have been 
unable to replicate the election campaign success in using social networks and television to 
present controversial measures on National Security and Foreign Policy – such as the 
Mexican border wall – in the form of reality entertainment. As allegations of collusion with 
the Russian government to rig the 2016 US election through hacking into high profile 
Democrats’ emails gained strength, Trump attempted to turn the Oval Office into the board 
room of “The Apprentice” and announced on social networks a series of dismissals from both 
his cabinet and governmental offices. Trump’s attempt to colonise new media to manage the 
security structure in the interests of business (Kellner, 2017), backfired. News of his inner 
circle’s meetings with key Russian agents circulates freely through digital networks. The 
failure of the ‘entertainment government’ provides additional evidence that whilst the ability 
to control new media can be a powerful political tool, it also invites increased scrutiny over 
the events that those wielding political power would prefer to conceal.  
 
Conclusions 
It has been the contention of this article that Susan Strange’s multi-dimensional theory of 
structural power requires the addition of a sociological dimension, just as she herself sought 
to add additional structural accounts in her international political economy approach, relative 
to the realism of international relations theory and the reductionism of Marxist political 
economy. In adding an account of knowledge structure based upon Manuel Castells’ 
morphogenic structural approach to digital networks we contend that Strange’s general theory 
is rendered more useful in exploring complex interactions in today’s global network capitalist 
society. In addressing whether today’s digital networks constitute a knowledge structure we 
examined whether such networked culture can resist colonisation by production, finance and 
security structures, and even undo elements of other structures’ internal regulative power. 
Whilst there are strong forces seeking to contain knowledge to serve other structural interests, 
digital networks do afford cultural resistance and even counter challenges. To a significant 
extent, digital networks allow for internal self-regulation in facilitating new social 
imaginaries that value the right to know over other values, external autonomy from reduction 
to other interests and even effectiveness in influencing other structural domains. We therefore 
conclude that such digital networks do indeed constitute a knowledge structure in the sense 
that Strange suggested but which the addition of a sociological dimension better elaborates. 
Strange balanced international relations and political economy within her international 
political economy. We suggest an international socio-political economy approach offers an 
even greater level of insight.  
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